In order to build the collection of Cauchy reals as a set in constructive set theory, the only Power Set-like principle needed is Exponentiation. In contrast, the proof that the Dedekind reals form a set has seemed to require more than that. The main purpose here is to show that Exponentiation alone does not suffice for the latter, by furnishing a Kripke model of constructive set theory, CZF with Subset Collection replaced by Exponentiation, in which the Cauchy reals form a set while the Dedekind reals constitute a proper class.
Introduction
In classical mathematics, one principal approach to defining the real numbers is to use equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences of rational numbers, and the other is the method of Dedekind cuts wherein reals appear as subsets of Q with special properties. Classically the two methods are equivalent in that the resulting field structures are easily shown to be isomorphic. As often happens in an intuitionistic setting, classically equivalent notions fork. Dedekind reals give rise to several demonstrably different collections of reals when only intuitionistic logic is assumed (cf. [18] , Ch.5, Sect.5). Here we shall be concerned with the most common and fruitful notion of Dedekind real which crucially involves the (classically superfluous) condition of locatedness of cuts. These Dedekind reals are sometimes referred to as the constructive Dedekind reals but we shall simply address them as the Dedekind reals. Even in intuitionistic set theory, with a little bit of help from the countable axiom of choice (AC(N, 2) 1 suffices; see [4] , 8.25), R d and R c are isomorphic (where R d and R c denote the collections of Dedekind reals and Cauchy reals, respectively). As R c is canonically embedded in R d we can view R c as a subset of R d so that the latter result can be stated as R d = R c . The countable axiom of choice is accepted in Bishop-style constructive mathematics but cannot be assumed in all intuitionistic contexts. Some choice is necessary for equating R d and R c as there are sheaf models of higher order intuitionistic logic in which R d is not isomorphic to R c (cf. [6] ). This paper will show that the difference between R d and R c can be of a grander scale. When is the continuum a set? The standard, classical construction of R as a set uses Power Set. Constructively, the weaker principle of Subset Collection (in the context of the axioms of Constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory CZF) suffices, as does even the apparently even weaker principle of Binary Refinement [5] . In contrast, we shall demonstrate that there is a Kripke model of CZF with Exponentiation in lieu of Subset Collection in which the Cauchy reals form a set while the Dedekind reals constitute a proper class. This shows that Exponentiation and Subset Collection Axiom have markedly different consequences for the theory of Dedekind reals.
This paper proves the following theorems: Even though the proof of the first theorem given here could be converted easily to the original Fourman-Hyland proof of the same, it is still included because the conversion in the other direction, from the original sheaf proof to the current Kripke model, is not obvious (to us at least); one might well want to know what the Kripke model proof of this theorem is. Furthermore, it is helpful as background to understand the construction of the second proof. While the second proof could similarly be turned into a purely topological argument, albeit of a non-standard type, unlike Gauss, we do not wish to cover our tracks. The original intuition here was the Kripke model -indeed, we know of no other way to motivate the unusual topological semantics and term structureand so it might be of practical utility to have that motivation present and up front. These benefits of presenting the Kripke constructions notwithstanding, this article is reader-friendly enough so that anyone who wanted to could simply skip the sections on constructing the models and go straight to the definitions of topological semantics (mod exchanging later on a few "true at node r"s with "forced by some neighborhood of r"s).
The paper is organized as follows. class of all sets R ⊆ A × B satisfying ∀u ∈ A ∃v ∈ B u, v ∈ R. A set C is said to be full in mv(
The expression mv( A B) should be read as the collection of multi-valued functions from the set A to the set B.
Additional axioms we shall consider are:
Fullness: ∀x∀y∃z z is full in mv( x y).
The next result provides an equivalent rendering of Subset Collection.
(ii) CZF ⊢ Exponentiation.
proof: [1] , Proposition 2.2. (The equality in (i) is as theories: that is, they both prove the same theorems.)
The Cauchy and Dedekind reals
Definition 1.5 A fundamental sequence is a sequence (r n ) n∈N of rationals, together with is a (Cauchy-)modulus f : N → N such that
where all quantifiers range over N. Two fundamental sequences (r n ) n∈N , (s n ) n∈N are said to coincide (in symbols ≈) if ∀k∃n∀m ≥ n |r m − s m | < 1 2 k . ≈ is indeed an equivalence relation on fundamental sequences. The set of Cauchy reals R c consists of the equivalence classes of fundamental sequences relative to ≈. For the equivalence class of (r n ) n∈N we use the notation (r n ) n∈N / ≈.
The development of the theory of Cauchy reals in [18] , Ch.5, Sect.2-4 can be carried out on the basis of CZF Exp . Note that the axiom AC-NN! 3 is deducible in CZF Exp . Definition 1.6 Let S ⊆ Q. S is called a left cut or Dedekind real if the following conditions are satisfied:
For X ⊆ Q define X < := {s ∈ Q : ∃r ∈ X s < r}. If S is a left cut it follows from openness and locatedness that S = S < .
Lemma 1.7 Let r = (r n ) n∈N and r ′ = (r ′ n ) n∈N be fundamental sequences of rationals. Define
We then have 1. X r is a Dedekind real.
Proof: Exercise or see [4] , Section 8.4. 
R
d = R c
Construction of the Model
Let M 0 ≺ M 1 ≺ ... be an ω-sequence of models of ZF set theory and of elementary embeddings among them, as indicated, such that the sequence from M n on is definable in M n , and such that each thinks that the next has nonstandard integers. Notice that this is easy to define (mod getting a model of ZF in the first place): an iterated ultrapower using any non-principal ultrafilter on ω will do. (If you're concerned that this needs AC too, work in L of your starting model.) We will ambiguously use the symbol f to stand for any of the elementary embeddings inherent in the M n -sequence.
Definition 2.2
The frame (underlying partial order) of the Kripke model M will be a (non-rooted) tree with ω-many levels. The nodes on level n will be the reals from M n . r ′ is an immediate successor of r iff r is a real from some M n , r ′ is a real from M n+1 , and r and r ′ are infinitesimally close; that is, f (r) − r ′ , calculated in M n+1 of course, is infinitesimal, calculated in M n of course. In other words, in M n , r is that standard part of r ′ .
The Kripke structure will be defined like a forcing extension in classical set theory. That is, there will be a ground model, terms that live in the ground model, and an interpretation of those terms, which, after modding out by =, is the final model M . Since the current construction is mostly just a re-phrasing of the topological, i.e. Heyting-valued, model of [6] , the similarity with forcing, i.e. Boolean-valued models, is not merely an analogy, but essentially the same material, and so it makes some sense to present it the way people are used to it. Definition 2.3 The ground Kripke model has, at each node of level n, a copy of M n . The transition functions (from a node to a following node) are the elementary embeddings given with the original sequence of models (and therefore will be notated by f again).
Note that by the elementarity of the extensions, this Kripke model is a model of classical ZF. More importantly, the model restricted to any node of level n is definable in M n , because the original M -sequence was so definable.
Definition 2.4
The terms are defined at each node separately. For a node at level n, the terms are defined in M n , inductively on the ordinals in M n . At any stage α, a term of stage α is a set σ of the form { σ i , J i | i ∈ I}, where I is some index set, each σ i is a term of stage < α, and each J i is an open subset of the real line.
(Often the terms at stage α are defined to be functions from the terms of all stages less than α, as opposed to the relations above, which may be non-total and multi-valued. This distinction makes absolutely no difference. Such a relation can be made total by sending all terms not yet in the domain to the empty set, and functional by taking unions of second components.)
Intuitively, each open set J is saying "the generic real is in me." Also, each node r is saying "I am the generic, or at least somebody in my infinitesimal universe is." So at node r, J should count at true iff r ∈ J. These intuitions will appear later as theorems. (Well, lemmas.)
The ground model can be embedded in this term structure: for x ∈ M n , its canonical namex is defined inductively as { ŷ, R | y ∈ x}. Terms of the form x are called ground model terms.
Notice that the definition of the terms given above is uniform among the M n 's, and so any term at a node gets sent by the transition function f to a corresponding term at any given later node. Hence we can use the same functions f yet again as the transition functions for this term model. (Their coherence on the terms follows directly from their coherence on the original M n 's.)
At this point in the construction of the Kripke model, we have the frame, a universe (set of objects) at each node, and the transition functions. Now we need to define the primitive relations at each node. In the language of set theory, these are = M and ∈ M (the subscript being used to prevent confusion with equality and membership of the ambient models M n ). This will be done via a forcing relation . 
(We will later extend this forcing relation to all formulas.) Note that these definitions, for J, σ, τ ∈ M n , can be evaluated in M n , without reference to M n+1 or to future nodes or anything. Therefore J φ (according to M n ) iff f (J) f (φ) (according to M n+1 ), by the elementarity of f . So we can afford to be vague about where various assertions are evaluated, since by this elementarity it doesn't matter. (The same will be true when we extend forcing to all formulas.) Definition 2.6 At node r, for any two terms σ and τ , σ = M τ iff, for some J with r ∈ J, J σ = M τ .
Also, at r, σ ∈ M τ iff for some J with r ∈ J, J σ ∈ M τ .
Notation Satisfaction (in the sense of Kripke semantics) at node r will be notated with |=, as in "r |= σ = τ ". This should not be confused with the forcing relation , even though the latter symbol is often used in the literature for Kripke satisfaction.
Thus we have a first-order structure at each node.
To have a Kripke model, the transition functions f must also respect this first-order structure, = M and ∈ M ; to wit:
We can now conclude that we have a Kripke model.
Lemma 2.8
This Kripke model satisfies the equality axioms:
proof: 1: It is easy to show with a simultaneous induction that, for all J and σ, J σ = M σ, and, for all
2: Trivial because the definition of J σ = M τ is itself symmetric. 3: For this and the subsequent parts, we need some lemmas.
proof: By induction on σ and τ .
proof: Again, by induction on terms.
Fix any r ∈ J ∩ J i , and let σ j , J j ∈ σ and J ′ be as given. By hypothesis,
which the desired conclusion follows by the induction.
Returning to proving property 3, the hypothesis is that for some J and K containing r, J ρ = M σ and K σ = M τ . By the first lemma, J ∩ K ρ = M σ, σ = M τ , and so by the second, J ∩ K ρ = M τ , which suffices.
By the first lemma, J ′ ∩J i ρ = M σ, and by the second, J ′ ∩ J i σ = M τ i . 5: Similar, and left to the reader.
With this lemma in hand, we can now mod out by = M , so that the symbol "=" is interpreted as actual set-theoretic equality. We will henceforth drop the subscript M from = and ∈, although we will not distinguish notationally between a term σ and the model element it represents, σ's equivalence class.
Note that, at any node r of level n, the whole structure M restricted to r and its successors is definable in M n , satisfaction relation |= and all. This will be useful when showing below that IZF holds. For instance, to show Separation, satisfaction r |= φ(x) will have to be evaluated in order to define the right separation term in M n , and so satisfaction must be definable in M n .
The Forcing Relation
The primitive relations = and ∈ were defined in terms of open sets J. To put it somewhat informally, at r, σ = or ∈ τ if this is forced by a true set, and a set J is true at r if r ∈ J. In fact, this phenomenon propagates to non-primitive formulas. To show this, we extend the forcing relation J φ from primitive to all (first-order, finitary) formulas. Then we prove as a lemma, the Truth Lemma, what was taken as a definition for the primitive formulas, that r |= φ iff J φ for some J containing r.
Definition 2.11 J φ is defined inductively on φ:
proof: 1. Trivial induction. The one observation to make regards negation, not mentioned above. As is standard, ¬φ is taken as an abbreviation for φ → ⊥, where ⊥ is any false formula. Letting ⊥ be "0=1", observe that ∅ ⊥. 2. Again, a trivial induction. 3. Easy induction. The one case to watch out for is →, where you need to invoke the previous part of this lemma.
4. Trivial, using 3.
Lemma 2.13 Truth Lemma: For any node r, r |= φ iff J φ for some J containing r.
proof: Again, by induction on φ, this time in detail for a change.
In all cases, the right-to-left direction ("forced implies true") is pretty easy, by induction. (Note that only the → case needs the left-to-right direction in this induction.) Hence in the following we show only left-to-right ("if true at a node then forced").
=: This is exactly the definition of =.
∈: This is exactly the definition of ∈. ∧: If r |= φ ∧ ψ, then r |= φ and r |= ψ. Inductively let r ∈ J φ and r ∈ J ′ ψ. J ∩ J ′ suffices. ∨: If r |= φ ∨ ψ, then without loss of generality r |= φ . Inductively let r ∈ J φ. J suffices.
→: Suppose to the contrary r |= φ → ψ but no open set containing r forces such. Work in an infinitesimal neighborhood J around r.
By the previous part of this lemma, there is an r ′ ∈ J ′ such that no open set containing r ′ forces ψ. At the node r ′ , by induction,
. This contradicts the assumption on r (i.e. that r |= φ → ψ), since r ′ extends r (as nodes).
∃: If r |= ∃x φ(x) then let σ be such that r |= φ(σ). Inductively there is a J containing r such that J φ(σ). J suffices.
∀: Suppose to the contrary r |= ∀x φ(x) but no open set containing r forces such. Work in an infinitesimal neighborhood J around r. Since J ∀x φ(x) there is an r ′ ∈ J and σ such that for all
Hence at the node r ′ , by induction, r ′ |= φ(σ). This contradicts the assumption on r (i.e. that r |= ∀x φ(x)).
The Final Proof
We now want to show that our model M satisfies certain global properties. If it had a bottom element ⊥, then we could express what we want by saying ⊥ |= φ for certain φ. But it doesn't. Hence we use the abbreviation M |= φ for "for all nodes r, r |= φ." Theorem 2.14 M |= IZF Ref .
proof: Note that, as a Kripke model, the axioms of intuitionistic logic are satisfied, by general theorems about Kripke models.
• Infinity:ω will do. (Recall that the canonical namex of any set x ∈ M n is defined inductively as { ŷ, R | y ∈ x}.)
• Pairing: Given σ and τ , { σ, R , τ, R } will do.
• Union: Given σ, { τ, J ∩ J i | for some σ i , τ, J ∈ σ i and σ i , J i ∈ σ} will do.
• Extensionality: We need to show that ∀x ∀y [∀z (z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) → x = y]. So let σ and τ be any terms at a node r such that r |= "∀z (z ∈ σ ↔ z ∈ τ )". We must show that r |= "σ = τ ". By the Truth Lemma, let r ∈ J "∀z (z ∈ σ ↔ z ∈ τ )"; i.e. for all r ′ ∈ J, ρ there is a J ′ containing r ′ such that J ∩ J ′ ρ ∈ σ ↔ ρ ∈ τ . We claim that J "σ = τ ", which again by the Truth Lemma suffices. To this end, let σ i , J i be in σ; we need to show that J ∩ J i σ i ∈ τ . Let r ′ be an arbitrary member of J ∩ J i and ρ be σ i . By the choice of J, let J ′ containing r ′ be such that
By going through each r ′ in J ∩ J i and using 2.12, part 3, we can conclude that J ∩ J i σ i ∈ τ , as desired. The other direction ("τ ⊆ σ") is analogous.
• Set Induction (Schema): Suppose r |= "∀x ((∀y ∈ x φ(y)) → φ(x))", where r ∈ M n ; by the Truth Lemma, let J containing r force as much. We must show r |= "∀x φ(x)". Suppose not. Using the definition of satisfaction in Kripke models, there is an r ′ ∈ M n ′ extending (i.e. infinitesimally close to) r (hence in J in the sense of M n ′ ) and a σ such that r ′ |= f (φ)(σ) (f the transition from from node r to r ′ ). By elementarity, there is such an r ′ in M n . Let σ be such a term of minimal V -rank among all r ′ s ∈ J. Fix such an r ′ . By the Truth Lemma (and the choice of J), r ′ |= "(∀y ∈ σ φ(y)) → φ(σ)". We claim that r ′ |= "∀y ∈ σ φ(y)". If not, then for some r ′′ extending r ′ (hence in J) and τ, r ′′ |= τ ∈ f (σ) and r ′′ |= f (φ)(τ ). Unraveling the interpretation of ∈, this choice of τ can be substituted by a term τ of lower V -rank than σ. By elementarity, such a τ would exist in M n , in violation of the choice of σ, which proves the claim. Hence r ′ |= φ(σ), again violating the choice of σ. This contradiction shows that r |= "∀x φ(x)".
• Separation (Schema): Let φ(x) be a formula and σ a term. Then { σ i , J ∩ J i | σ i , J i ∈ σ and J φ(σ i )} will do.
• Power Set: A termσ is a normal form subset of σ if for all σ i ,J i ∈σ there is a J i ⊇J i such that σ i , J i ∈ σ. { σ, R |σ is a normal form subset of σ} will do.
• Reflection (Schema): Recall that the statement of Reflection is that for every formula φ(x) (with free variable x and unmentioned parameters) and set z there is a transitive set Z containing z such that Z reflects the truth of φ(x) in V for all x ∈ Z. So to this end, let φ(x) be a formula and σ be a set at a node r of level n. Let k be such that the truth of φ(x) at node r and beyond is Σ k definable in M n . In M n , let X be a set containing σ, r, and φ's parameters such that X ≺ k M n . Let τ be { ρ, R | ρ ∈ X is a term}. τ will do.
Just as in the case of regular, classical forcing, there is a generic element. In the case at hand, this generic can be identified with the term { r, J | r is a rational, J is an open interval from the reals, and r < J}, where r < J if r is less than each element of J. We will call this term G. Note that at node r (of level n), every standard (in the sense of M n ) rational less than r gets into G, and no standard real greater than r will ever get into G. Of course, non-standard reals infinitesimally close to r are still up for grabs.
It is important in the following that, if r |= σ ∈ Q, then there is a rational q in the sense of M n (n r's level) such that r |= σ = q. That's because rationals are (equivalence classes of) pairs of naturals, and the corresponding fact holds for naturals. And that last statement holds because M |= "N is the set of natural numbers", and the topological space on which the model is built is connected. Hence, at r, a Cauchy sequence of rationals is just what you'd think: a sequence with domain N in the sense of M n , range Q in the sense of M n , with the right Cauchy condition on it, which gets extended to a larger domain at successors of r.
Proposition 2.15 M |= "G is a constructive Dedekind real, i.e. a located left cut".
proof: First off, r |= "r − 1 ∈ G ∧ r + 1 ∈ G". Secondly, if r |= "s < t ∈ G", then t, J ∈ G, where t < J and r ∈ J. Hence s < J, so s, J ∈ G, and r |= s ∈ G. Finally, suppose r |= "s, t ∈ Q ∧ s < t". Either s < r or r < t. Since s and t are both standard (in the sense of M n , n the level of r), either r |= s ∈ G or r |= t ∈ G respectively. In order to complete the theorem, we need only prove the following: Proposition 2.16 M |= "The Dedekind real G is not a Cauchy real."
proof: Recall that a Cauchy sequence is a function f : N → Q such that for all k ∈ N there is an m k ∈ N such that, for all i, j > m k , f (i) and f (j) are within 2 −k of each other. Classically such a function k → m k , called a modulus of convergence, could be defined from f , but not constructively (see [10] ). Often in a constructive setting a real number is therefore taken to be a pair of a Cauchy sequence and such a modulus (or an equivalence class thereof). We will prove the stronger assertion that G is not even the limit of a Cauchy sequence, even without a modulus. (A Dedekind real Y is the limit of the Cauchy sequence f exactly when r ∈ Y iff r < f (m k ) − 2 −k for some k, where m k is an integer as above.)
Suppose r |= "f is a Cauchy sequence". By the Truth Lemma, there is an open set J containing r forcing the same. There are two cases.
CASE I: There is some open set J ′ containing r forcing a value f (m) for each integer m in M n (where r ∈ M n ). In this case, f is a ground model function; that is, in M n , hence in each M k with k ≥ n, g(m) can be defined as the unique l such that J ′ f (m) =l, and then J ′ f =ĝ. Since classical logic holds in M n , either lim(f ) is bounded away from r, say by a distance of 2 −k , or it's not. If it is, then r |= G = lim(f ), as follows. Let J ′′ be an interval around r of length less than 2 −k . J ′′ r − 2− k ∈ G ∧r + 2− k ∈ G, while f stays more than 2 −k away from r.
If on the other hand f is not bounded away from r, then the condition "s < f (m k ) − 2 −k for some k" becomes simply "s < r". So then f would witness that s ∈ G iff s < r. But this is false: if r ′ is less than r by an infinitesimal amount, then r ′ |=r ′ <r but r ′ |=r ′ ∈ G, and if r ′ is greater than r by an infinitesimal amount, and s is between r and r ′ , then r ′ |=ŝ >r but r ′ |=ŝ ∈ G. CASE II: Not case I. That means that for any interval J ′ around r, however small, there is some argument m to f such that J ′ does not force any value f (m). By elementarity, in M n+1 pick J ′ to be some infinitesimally small neighborhood around r, and m such an argument. Pick some value q that f (m) could have and the maximal (hence non-empty, proper, and open) subset of J ′ forcing f (m) =q. Pick the maximal (hence non-empty, proper, and open) subset of J ′ forcing f (m) =q. These two subsets must be disjoint, lest the intersection force a contradiction. But an open interval cannot be covered by two disjoint, non-empty open sets. Hence there is an infinitesimal s in neither of those two subsets. Now consider the Kripke model at node s. f (m) is undefined at s. Otherwise, by the Truth Lemma, there would be some interval J containing s such that J f (m) =p for some particular rational p. Whether or not p = q would force s into one of the subsets or the other. Therefore, the node r cannot force that f is total, contradicting the hypothesis that r forced that f was a Cauchy sequence.
Comments and Questions
Those familiar with the proof via the (full) topological model, or sheaves, over R, as in [6] for instance, will realize that it's essentially the same as the one above. In fact, the topological/sheaf construction can be read off of the argument above. All of the proofs are based on constructing the right term and/or using an open set to force a statement.
That is exactly what's present in a topological model: the terms here are the standard terms for a topological model, and the forcing relation here is the standard topological semantics. So the Kripke superstructure is actually superfluous for this argument. Nonetheless, several questions arise.
What the Kripke structure has that the topological model doesn't are the infinitesimals. Are they somehow hidden in the topological model? Are they dispensable in the Kripke model? Or are the models more than superficially different?
Also, is there some reason that the topology was necessary in the Kripke construction? The authors started this project with the idea of using a Kripke model, were led to infinitesimals, and did not suspect that any topological ideas would be necessary. (In some detail, suppose you're looking at a Dedekind cut in a node of a Kripke model. By locatedness, if p < q then one of those two rationals gets put into either the lower or the upper cut; that is, we can remain undecided about the placement of at most one rational, which for simplicity we may as well take to be 0. Then why doesn't the Cauchy sequence 1/n name this cut? That can happen only if, at some later node, the cut no longer looks to be around 0. But how can that happen if all other rationals are already decided? Only if at this later node there are new rationals that weren't there at the old node. This leads directly to indexing nodes by infinitesimals, and having the cut look at any node as though it's defining the infinitesimal at that node. Notice that there seems to be no reason to use topology here.) It was only after several attempts to define the terms, with their equality and membership relations, using just the partial order all failed that they were driven to the current, topological solution. Since this all happened before we became aware of the earlier Fourman-Hyland work, it is not possible that we were somehow pre-disposed toward turning to topology. Rather, it seems that topology is inherent in the problem. Is there some way to make that suggestion precise and to see why it's true?
Indeed, this question becomes even more pressing in light of the next section. There topology is used in a similar way, but the terms and the semantics are like nothing we have seen before. Indeed, the construction following could not be in its essence a topological model of the kind considered so far in the literature, since the latter always model IZF, whereas the former will falsify Power Set (satisfying Exponentiation in its stead). So if there were some method to read off the topology from the problem in this section, it would be of great interest to see what that method would give us in the next problem.
There are other, soft reasons to have included the preceding construction, even though it adds little to the Fourman-Hyland argument. Conceivably, somebody could want to know what the paradigmatic Kripke model for the Cauchy and Dedekind reals differing is, and this is it. It also provides a nice warm-up for the more complicated work of the next section, to which we now turn.
The Dedekind Reals Are Not a Set
Theorem 3.1 CZF Exp (i.e. CZF with Subset Collection replaced by Exponentiation) does not prove that the Dedekind reals form a set.
The Construction
Any model showing what is claimed must have certain properties. For one, the Dedekind reals cannot equal the Cauchy reals (since CZF Exp proves that the Cauchy reals are a set). Hence the current model takes its inspiration from the previous one. Also, it must falsify Subset Collection (since CZF proves that the Dedekind reals are a set). Hence guidance is also taken from [8] , where such a model is built.
The idea behind the latter is that a (classical, external) relation R on N keeps on being introduced into the model via a term ρ but at a later node "disappears"; more accurately, the information ρ contains gets erased, because ρ grows into all of N × N, thereby melting away into the other sets present (to give a visual image). Since R is chosen so that it doesn't help build any functions, ρ can be ignored when proving Exponentiation. On the other hand, while you're free to include ρ in an alleged full set of relations, by the next node there is no longer any trace of R, so when R reappears later via a different term ρ ′ your attempt at a full set no longer works.
In the present context, we will do something similar. The troublesome relation will be (essentially) the Dedekind real G from the previous construction. It will "disappear" in that, instead of continuing to change its mind about what it is at all future nodes, it will settle down to one fixed, standard real at all next nodes. But then some other real just like G will appear and pull the same stunt.
We now begin with the definition of the Kripke model, which ultimately is distributed among the next several definitions.
Definition 3.2 The underlying p.o. of the Kripke model is the same as above: a (non-rooted) tree with ω-many levels, the nodes on level n being the reals from M n . r ′ is an immediate successor of r iff r is a real from some M n , r ′ is a real from M n+1 , and r and r ′ are infinitesimally close; that is, f (r) − r ′ , calculated in M n+1 of course, is infinitesimal, calculated in M n of course. In other words, in M n , r is that standard part of r ′ .
Definition 3.3 A term at a node of height n is a set of the form
where each σ is (inductively) a term, each J an open set of reals, each r a real, and H and I index sets, all in the sense of M n .
The first part of each term is as in the previous section: at node r, J i counts as true iff r ∈ J i . The second part plays a role only when we decide to have the term settle down and stop changing. This settling down in described as follows. Definition 3.4 For a term σ and real r ∈ M n , σ r is defined inductively in M n on the terms as { σ
Note that σ r is (the image of) a set from the ground model. It bears observation that (σ r ) s = σ r . What determines when a term settles down in this way is the transition function. In fact, from any node to an immediate successor, there will be two transition functions, one the embedding f as before and the other the settling down function. This fact of the current construction does not quite jive with the standard definition of a Kripke model, which has no room for alternate ways to go from one node to another. However, this move is standard (even tame) for categorical models, which allow for arbitrary arrows among objects. So while the standard categorical description of a partial order is a category where the objects are the elements of the order and there's an arrow from p to q iff p ≤ q, the category we're working in has two arrows from p to q (for immediate successors). If you're still uncomfortable with this double arrow, or object to calling this object a Kripke model, then double not the arrows but the nodes. That is, replace each node s by two nodes s old and s new , and have the two arrows go to these two separate nodes. Now you have a very traditional Kripke model again. To save on subscripts, we will work instead with two arrows going from r to s. When considering g(σ), note that σ ∈ M n and s ∈ M n+1 . However, for purposes other than the transition functions, we will have occasion to look at σ s for both σ and s from M n . In this case, please note that, since f is an elementary embedding, (f (σ)) s = f (σ s ). It's easy to see that for σ a (term for a) ground model set, f (σ) is also a ground model set, and for τ from the ground model (such as f (σ)) so is τ r . Hence in this case f (σ) = g(σ).
We do not need to show that the transition functions are well-defined, since they are defined on terms and not on equivalence classes of terms. However, once we define =, we will show that = is an equivalence relation and that f and g respect =, so that we can mod out by = and still consider f and g as acting on these equivalence classes.
Speaking of defining =, we now do so, simultaneously with ∈ and inductively on the terms, like in the previous section. In an interplay with the settling down procedure, the definition is different from in the previous section. J σ = M τ iff for all σ i , J i ∈ σ J ∩J i σ i ∈ M τ and for all r ∈ J σ r = τ r , and vice versa. J σ ∈ M τ iff for all r ∈ J there is a τ i , J i ∈ τ and J ′ ⊆ J such that r ∈ J ′ ∩ J i σ = M τ i , and for all r ∈ J σ r , R ∈ τ r .
(We will later extend this forcing relation to all formulas.) Definition 3.7 At a node r, for any two terms σ and τ , r |= σ = M τ iff, for some J with r ∈ J, J σ = M τ . Also, r |= σ ∈ M τ iff for some J with r ∈ J, J σ ∈ M τ .
Corollary 3.8 The model just defined is a Kripke model. That is, the transition functions are = M and ∈ M -homomorphisms.
proof: Note that the coherence of the transition functions is not an issue for us. That is, normally one has to show that the composition of the transition functions from nodes p to q and from q to r is the transition function from p to r. However, in our case, the transition functions were given only for immediate successors, and arbitrary compositions are allowed. So there's nothing about coherence to prove. If r |= σ = M τ then let r ∈ J σ = M τ . For s an immediate successor of r, s is infinitesimally close to r, so s ∈ f (J). Also, by elementarity,
. It is easy to see that for any term ρ R ρ = M ρ, so s ∈ R g(σ) = M g(τ ), and s |= g(σ) = M g(τ ).
Similarly for ∈ M .
Lemma 3.9 This Kripke model satisfies the equality axioms:
proof: Similar to the equality lemma from the previous section. For those who are concerned that the new forcing relation might make a difference and therefore want to see the details, here they come. 1: It is easy to show with a simultaneous induction that, for all J and σ, J σ = M σ, and, for all σ i , J i ∈ σ, J ∩ J i σ i ∈ M σ. Those parts of the definition of = M and ∈ M that are identical to those of the previous section follow by the same inductive argument of the previous section. The next clauses, in the current context, boil down to σ r = σ r , which is trivially true, and, for σ i , J i ∈ σ and r ∈ J i , σ r i , R ∈ τ r , which follows immediately from the definition of τ r . 2: Trivial because the definition of J σ = M τ is itself symmetric. 3: For this and the subsequent parts, we need some lemmas. proof: By induction on σ and τ .
6. If R φ, then we have to show that R ¬φ, that is R φ → ⊥. Sincer ∈ J ∃x φ(x), let J ′ and σ be such that r ∈ J ∩ J ′ φ(σ). Inductively r |= φ(σ), so r |= ∃x φ(x).
∀: For the left-to-right direction, suppose at node r that r |= ∀x φ(x). If there were no interval J forcing the first clause in the ∀-forcing definition, then let J be an infinitesimal neighborhood around r. Let s ∈ J and σ be such that there is no J ′ containing s such that J ′ f (φ)(σ). Inductively s |= f (φ)(σ), which is a contradiction.
If there were no interval J forcing the second clause in the ∀-forcing definition, then let J be an infinitesimal neighborhood around r. Let s ∈ J and σ be such that there is no
, which is a contradiction. The right-to-left direction is trivial.
The Final Proof
It remains to show only proof: The only axioms below, the proofs of which are essentially different from the corresponding proofs in section 2, are Set Induction, Strong Collection, Separation, and, of course, Exponentiation.
s |= "ρ : g(σ) → g(τ ) is a function" and ρ is a ground model term, then s |= ρ ∈ g(C) by the second clause. What we must show is that for any node r and sets X and Y , if r |= "ρ :X →Ŷ is a function", then some neighborhood of r forces ρ equal to a ground model function.
By the Truth Lemma, let r ∈ J "ρ :X →Ŷ is a function". We claim that for all x ∈ X there is a y ∈ Y such that for each s ∈ J s |= ρ(x) =ŷ. If not, let x be otherwise. Let y be such that r |= ρ(x) =ŷ. For each immediate successor s of r, s |= f (ρ)(f (x)) = f (ŷ). By overspill the same holds for some neighborhood around r (sans the f 's). If this does not hold for all s ∈ J, let s be an endpoint in J of the largest interval around r for which this does hold. Repeating the same argument around s, there is a y ′ such that, for all t in some neighborhood of s, t |= ρ(x) =ŷ ′ . This neighborhood of s must overlap that of r, though. So y = y ′ , contradicting the choice of s. So the value ρ(x) is fixed on the whole interval J, and ρ is forced by J to equal a particular ground model function.
• Separation: Although CZF contains only ∆ 0 Separation, full Separation holds here. Let φ(x) be a formula and σ a term. Then
• Strong Collection: If r |= ∀x ∈ σ ∃y φ(x, y), let r ∈ J force as much. For each σ i , J i ∈ σ and s ∈ J ∩ J i , let τ i,s and J i,s be such that s ∈ J i,s φ(σ i , τ i,s ). Also, for each s ∈ J and x, R ∈ σ s , let τ x,s be such that some neighborhood of s forces φ s (x, τ x,s ). (Notice that, by 3.14 part 5,
proof: First note that the same generic term from the last section, G := { r, J | r is a rational, J is an open interval from the reals, and r < J}, still defines a Dedekind cut. In fact, half of the proof of such is just the argument from the last section itself. That's because most of the properties involved with being a Dedekind real are local. For instance, if s < t are rationals at any given node, then it must be checked at that node whether s ∈ G or t ∈ G. For this, the earlier arguments work unchanged. The same applies to images of G at later nodes, as long as such image satisfies the same definition, i.e. is of the form f (G). We must check what happens when G settles down. Cranking through the definition, G s = { r, R | r < s}, which is the Dedekind cut standing for s, and which satisfies all the right properties.
Furthermore, although G can become a ground model real, it isn't one itself: there are no J and r such that J G =r. That's because there is a K ⊆ J with either r < s < K or K < s < r (some s). In the former case, K ŝ ∈ G, i.e. K r < G; in the latter, K ¬ŝ ∈ G, i.e. K r > G.
Finally, to see that the Dedekind reals do not form a set, let σ be a term at any node. g(σ) is a ground model term. So if any J G ∈ g(σ), then for some K ⊆ J, K G =r for some real r, which we just saw cannot happen. So σ cannot name the set of Dedekind reals.
Not infrequently, when some weaker axioms are shown to hold, what interests people is not why the weaker ones are true but why the stronger ones aren't. The failure of Subset Collection, and hence of Power Set too, is exactly what the previous paragraph is about, but perhaps the failure of Power Set is more clearly seen on the simpler set 1 = {0} = {∅}. After applying a settling down transition function g to a set σ, the only subsets of 1 in g(σ) are 0 and 1. But in M 1 has more subsets than that. For instance, at node r, { ∅, J | min J > r} is 0 at all future nodes s < f (r) and 1 at all future nodes s > f (r). So σ could never have been the power set of 1 to begin with, because g(σ) is missing some such subsets.
This same example also shows that Reflection fails: that the power set of 1 does not exist is true in M , as above, but not true within any set, as once that set settles down, {0, 1} is indeed the internal power set of 1.
Comments and Questions The settling down process, as explained when introduced, was motivated by the construction in [8] . The change in the terms (adding members based not on open sets but on individual real numbers, to be used only when settling down) was quickly seen to be necessary to satisfy Separation. But where does the unusual topological semantics come from? The topology is the same: the space is still R, the only things that force statements are the same open sets as before; it's just a change in the meaning of the forcing relation , the semantics. It is no surprise that there would have to be some change, in the base cases (= and ∈) if nowhere else. But why exactly those changes as presented in the inductive cases? The authors found them through a bothersome process of trial and error, and have no explanation for them.
Would this new semantics have interesting applications elsewhere? As an example of a possible kind of application, consider the topology of this article. Under the standard semantics, there is a Dedekind cut which is not a Cauchy sequence. With the new semantics, the collections of Dedekind and Cauchy reals differ (the latter being a set and the former not), but not for that reason. In fact, any Dedekind cut is not not equal to a Cauchy real: just apply a settling down transition. These collections differ because the Dedekind reals include some things that are just not yet Cauchy reals. So this semantics might be useful for gently separating concepts, getting sets (or classes) of things to be unequal without producing any instance of one which is not the other.
Finally, which axioms does this new semantics verify? For instance, in [10] a topological model for a generic Cauchy sequence is given. Analogously with the current construction, wherein a generic Dedekind cut in a model with settling down implies that there is no set of Dedekind cuts, in a model with settling down and a generic Cauchy sequence the Cauchy sequences are not a set. That would mean that not even Exponentiation holds. So what does hold generally under this semantics?
